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Climate Change, Scale, and Devaluation: The
Challenge of Our Built Environment
Nathan F. Sayre*

Abstract
Climate debate and policy proposals in the United States have yet to
grasp the gravity and magnitude of the challenges posed by global warming.
This paper develops three arguments to redress this situation. First, the spatial
and temporal scale of the processes linking greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
to climate change is unprecedented in human experience, challenging our
abilities to comprehend, let alone act. An adequate understanding of the scale
of global warming leads to an unequivocal starting point for all discussions:
we must leave as much fossil fuel in the ground as possible, for as long as
possible. Second, a policy informed by this insight must focus on the built
environment, which mediates economic production, exchange, and
consumption in ways that both presuppose and reinforce high rates of GHG
emissions, especially in the U.S. A rapid and comprehensive reconfiguration
of the built environment is imperative if we are to mitigate and adapt to global
warming. Third, the obstacles and opposition to such a reconfiguration are
best understood in terms of the devaluation of fixed capital, public and private
investments alike, that has been sunk in the built environment of the present. In
a fortuitous paradox, these investments are threatened with devaluation
whether or not we act to stabilize the atmospheric GHG concentrations; in
highly uneven, unpredictable, and potentially abrupt ways, global warming
will make our current built environment increasingly untenable and
uneconomical. There is, therefore, no reason not to be proactive and to craft
policies with the goal of completely redesigning and rebuilding our built
environment over the next 20 to 50 years.
Keywords: climate change, global warming, scale, fixed capital,
devaluation, built environment
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I. Introduction

Writing in Science Magazine1 in 2007, renowned climate scientist Wallace
Broecker declared, "[i]f we are ever to succeed in capping the buildup of the
atmosphere’s CO2 content, we must make a first-order change in the way we
view the problem."2 He pointed out that merely reducing the rate of
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is insufficient, as this would still result in a
continuing rise in atmospheric GHG concentrations, and therefore continued
global warming.3 The only real solution, Broecker argued, is to stabilize
concentrations, and he offered the following "CO2 Arithmetic" to clarify the
implications:
Currently, for each 4 gigatons (Gt) of fossil carbon burned, the
atmosphere’s CO2 content rises about 1 ppm; including deforestation, we
now emit about 8 Gt of carbon per year. Further, this four-to-one ratio will
only change slowly in the coming decades. Hence, if we set a desirable
upper limit on the extent to which we allow the CO2 content of the
atmosphere to increase, then this fixes the size of the carbon pie.4

The point of the pie metaphor is that GHG emissions must be limited
absolutely to achieve any real solution to climate change. For example, to
achieve stabilization at twice pre-industrial levels, which is considered by many
scientists to be dangerously high but is still much lower than the projection for
2100, humanity can only emit about 720 Gt of additional carbon from now
onwards.5 We will exhaust the carbon pie before the end of the century at
current rates of GHG emissions, and much sooner if rates increase as expected.
Broecker, believing that such a target is unattainable by other means, went on
1. Wallace S. Broecker, Climate Change: CO2 Arithmetic, SCI. MAG., Mar. 9, 2007, at
1371.
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. The carbon pie has already shrunk since Broecker wrote. It now amounts to about 696
Gt, as concentrations have risen from 380 to 386 ppm.
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to argue for technologies to capture CO2 directly from the atmosphere,6 a
strategy he describes at greater length in the book Fixing Climate.7 Such
technologies, if they can be invented and deployed on an enormous scale,
would expand the carbon pie and relax the limits that Broecker described.
Counting on such a silver bullet is a high-risk strategy, however, akin to
continuing to smoke on the assumption that a cure to cancer will be found in
time to save you. Technological optimism may also distract us from making
the "first-order change in the way we view the problem" that Broecker urged in
the opening sentence of his article.8 Understanding the climate science behind
Broecker’s CO2 arithmetic is only one part of making this change; we must also
consider political and economic circumstances, which are absent from his
analysis. Why does addressing climate change require an absolute limit on total
GHG emissions, and not just reductions in emissions rates? How can we
realize such a limit? Finally, why does it seem so unattainable? What are the
fundamental obstacles to an adequate climate policy?
I offer three interlinked arguments in answer to these questions. First, the
spatial and temporal scale of the processes linking GHG emissions to climate
change is unprecedented in human experience, challenging our abilities to
comprehend, let alone act. An adequate understanding of the scale of global
warming leads to an unequivocal starting point for all discussions: we must
leave as much fossil fuel in the ground as possible, for as long as possible.
Second, policies informed by this insight must focus on the built environment,
which mediates economic production, exchange, and consumption in ways that
both presuppose and reinforce high rates of GHG emissions, especially in the
U.S. A rapid and comprehensive reconfiguration of the built environment is
imperative if we are to mitigate and adapt to global warming. Third, the
obstacles and opposition to such a reconfiguration are best understood in terms
of the devaluation of fixed capital, public and private investments alike, which
has been sunk in the built environment of the present. In a fortuitous paradox,
these investments are threatened with devaluation whether or not we act to
stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations; in highly uneven, unpredictable,
and potentially abrupt ways, global warming will make our current built
environment increasingly untenable and uneconomical. Therefore, there is no
reason not to be proactive and to craft policies with the goal of completely
redesigning and rebuilding our built environment over the next 20 to 50 years.
6.
7.

See id.
See WALLACE S. BROECKER & ROBERT KUNZIG, FIXING CLIMATE: WHAT PAST
CLIMATE CHANGES REVEAL ABOUT THE CURRENT THREAT—AND HOW TO COUNTER IT. (Hill and
Wang 2008).
8. Broecker, supra note 1, at 1371.
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II. The Scale of Global Warming

Science journalist Elizabeth Kolbert has written that “[f]or better or
(mostly) for worse, global warming is all about scale.”9 Scientists typically
define scale in terms of grain or resolution, on the one hand, and extent, on the
other.10 Grain refers to the smallest unit of measurement employed to study
some phenomenon, and therefore the precision or detail that can be detected.11
Extent is the overall dimensions over which observations are made, including
both space (area) and time (duration).12 Different phenomena require different
scales, because the grain and extent of a study need to "fit" what one is
observing in order to detect meaningful patterns or dynamics. A simple
illustration: the grain used to time a race has to be fine enough to distinguish
among the racers. In world-class swimming, for example, this is hundredths or
even thousandths of a second; if the grain were coarser—seconds, in this
example—there would be lots of ties, defeating the purpose of the race.
Generally speaking, grain and extent vary in rough proportion to each other: a
large extent means a coarser grain, whereas a finer grain is called for when
making measurements over smaller extents. Longer races, to continue the
example, can generally be timed using larger units. This is the case for both
methodological and ontological reasons.
If one applies this definition of scale to environmental phenomena
themselves, rather than to the measurements used to study them, it becomes
clear that Kolbert is right to suggest that the scale of global warming is unlike
anything else that humanity has ever experienced.13 The processes that link
GHG emissions to climate change combine extremely fine grains and extremely
large extents, both spatially and temporally.
Spatially, the grain is minutely small: individual molecules of CO2 and
other greenhouse gases.14 They are invisible to the naked eye and produced in
myriad ways, for example: when we breathe or turn over a spade of soil, when
9. ELIZABETH KOLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE: MAN, NATURE, AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (Bloomsbury Publishers 2006).
10. See Nathan F. Sayre, Ecological and Geographical Scale: Parallels and Potential for
Integration, 29 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 276, 278 (2005).
11. See id. at
12. See id. at
13. KOLBERT, supra note 9, at
14. See C.L. Sabine and R.A. Feely. 2003. Carbon Dioxide. Pp. 335-343 in J.R. Holton,
J.A. Curry and J.A. Pyle, eds. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES. Academic Press. See
also E.G. Nisbet. 2003. Biogeochemical cycles: Carbon cycle. Pp. 196-201 in J.R. Holton, J.A.
Curry and J.A. Pyle, eds. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES. Academic Press. [USE
THESE TWO SOURCES FOR FOOTNOTES 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, & 22.]
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a plant decays, when a cow ruminates, as well as when wood, coal, gas or oil is
burnt.15 But the extent is global: all those molecules join the earth’s
atmosphere and quickly mix together, becoming equal parts of the enhanced
greenhouse effect.16 Over time, some CO2 molecules are absorbed by plants,
some by the oceans, some by the soil, and some eventually degrade or break
down, but where or from what they were earlier emitted has no effect on the
path they subsequently take.17 The impacts of global warming are not
homogeneous in space, and GHG emissions are also very unevenly
distributed.18 But the process by which greenhouse gases enhance the
greenhouse effect is indifferent to such geographical specifics.
Temporally, the grain is likewise infinitesimal: that split second at which
a chemical reaction occurs in combustion, photosynthesis, oxidation, decay,
etc.19 But the extent is very long: once a molecule of carbon dioxide or nitrous
oxide enters the atmosphere, it remains there for more than a century; most
other greenhouse gases persist for one-to-several decades.20 Looking backward
in time, the temporal extent is longer still, although it varies depending on the
process by which a carbon molecule was earlier sequestered; it could be
decades or centuries for carbon stored in trees, up to centuries for carbon in the
soil, and hundreds of millions of years for the carbon in coal, gas or oil.21 This
combination of short grain and long extent means that whatever the amount of
CO2 emitted in excess of the amount reabsorbed or sequestered during a given
period of time is out there for good, for all practical purposes.22
The difficulties of confronting global warming are a function of these
unique scalar qualities. Such extreme disparities between spatio-temporal grain
and extent are exceptional among environmental processes of any direct
significance to humans. Pollution of air, water, and soil is often fine-grained,
15. See note 14 above.
16. See note 14 above. Other greenhouse gases have different global warming potentials
(GWP) per molecule; I use CO2 here because it is the single largest contributor to the enhanced
greenhouse effect overall. The point is that greenhouse gases from all sources join the
atmosphere at a global scale to produce warming.
17. See note 14 above.
18. Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri, and A. Reisinger (Eds.) Core Writing Team,
Pachauri, R.K. and Reisinger, A. (Eds.). CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUPS I, II AND III TO THE
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE. IPCC
(2007).
19. See note 14 above.
20. See T.J. Blasing, Recent Greenhouse Gas Concentrations, CARBON DIOXIDE INFO.
ANALYSIS CENTER, http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/current_ghg.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
21. Blasing, supra note 20. See also note 14 above.
22. Sayre, supra note 9, at Blasing, supra note 20. See also note 14 above.
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but usually local-to-regional in spatial extent, with a temporal extent of weeks
to decades.23 Even nitrogen loading and soil erosion, which have small grains,
large extents, and persistent effects, can be addressed at regional scales over
periods of years to decades.24 Earthquakes provide a partial analog to climate
change, insofar as vast quantities of energy accumulate so slowly, over so much
space and time, as to pass unnoticed until the event occurs.25 Earthquakes,
however, are temporally discrete and spatially limited, whereas climate change
is global and, in most respects, extremely gradual in its effects. Radioactivity is
analogous in a different way: it is invisibly small in substance yet persistent on
a temporal scale of millennia and dispersed around the world due to above
ground nuclear testing during the Cold War.26 But radioactivity of the kind we
worry about is not produced by nearly so many organisms, processes and
activities as greenhouse gases, and its impacts (as of yet) have been limited.27
Finally, volcanoes can affect climate at the global scale, but only for a few
years.28 One might venture the thought that humans can barely think at the
scale of global warming—after all, we have never had to do so before.29 More
specifically, the reason we must live within an absolute limit of GHG
emissions, why Broecker’s carbon pie is finite, is the enormous difference of
temporal scale between fossil fuels and other sources and sinks of atmospheric
CO2. When a grassland burns, it releases carbon that was sequestered just 1-10
years before. The carbon released by a forest fire was sequestered decades or at
23. For air pollution see H.L. Windsor and R. Toumi. 2001. Scaling and persistence of
UK pollution. ATMOSPHERIC ENVIRONMENT 35: 4545-4556. For soil and water pollution see
K.C. Jones and P. de Voogt. 1999. Persistent organic pollutants (POPs): state of the science.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION 100: 209-221.
24. See, e.g., W.J. Mitsch et al. 2001. Reducing nitrogen loading to the Gulf of Mexico
from the Mississippi River Basin: strategies to counter a persistent ecological problem.
BIOSCIENCE 51: 373-388. C. Huang, L.D. Norton and D.C. Flanagan. 2009. Challenges in
linking agricultural soil erosion studies to landscape scale processes. GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH
ABSTRACTS
11:
10142
(at:
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?seq_no_115=236013).
25. A. Sornette and D. Sornette. 1989. Self-organized criticality and earthquakes.
EUROPHYSICS LETTERS 9: 197-202.
26. See R. Wolfson. 1991. NUCLEAR CHOICES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO NUCLEAR
TECHNOLOGY. MIT Press, pp. 60-63. E. Welsome. 1999. THE PLUTONIUM FILES. Dell Publishing.
27. R.L. Murray. 2003. UNDERSTANDING RADIOACTIVE WASTE. 5th edition. Battelle Press.
28. A. Robock. 2000. Volcanic eruptions and climate. REVIEW OF GEOPHYSICS 38: 191219.
29. It is rather like the revolution produced by geology when it became irrefutably clear
that the earth was not thousands but billions of years old—only this time we’re dealing with the
future rather than just the past, and with a problem whose implications are practical rather than
merely intellectual, theological or doctrinal. This time, our understanding is not the only thing at
stake.
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most centuries ago. With fossil fuels, by contrast, sequestration occurred
hundreds of millions of years ago; 6-8 orders of magnitude greater than with
plants, 5-6 orders of magnitude greater than with soils. These disparities are
critically important when evaluating ways to reduce atmospheric CO2
concentrations because planting trees can only sequester carbon until the trees
die, and although carbon can stay in soil for centuries, the soil must remain
unplowed. As the Keeling Curve shows, atmospheric CO2 concentrations
oscillate every year due to the aggregate effects of all the vegetation on earth;
the curve drops by 5-6 ppm during the northern hemisphere’s summer, when
plants there absorb CO2 in photosynthesis, then it rises as plants senesce and
decay in the winter. The point is that compared to the magnitude of the longerterm trend—atmospheric CO2 is already more than 100 ppm above preindustrial levels—the potential of vegetation to address climate change is an
order of magnitude too small.
This is not to diminish the significant role that deforestation plays as a
source of CO2 emissions at present,30 but rather to point out that no matter what
happens to forests, it happens on a temporal scale completely different from
that of fossil fuels. Although the CO2 from both sources mixes readily in the
atmosphere, and has equivalent GWP, the two carbon cycles should be seen as
distinct for purposes of policy. Efforts to prevent deforestation, or to plant new
forests, cannot scale up sufficiently because trees simply do not live long
enough. A protected forest will still die and release its carbon, and a planted
forest will do the same, but it will be too soon to effectively ‘cancel out’ the
release of CO2 from fossil fuels. The only way around this problem would be
to cut down the trees before they die and permanently remove them from
contact with the atmosphere—by sinking them in the deep ocean, burying them
on land, or shooting them into space. In other words, as long as fossil fuels
continue to be burned at rates that exceed the capacity of sinks to absorb the
resulting emissions at a comparable temporal scale, 31 atmospheric
concentrations will continue to increase. Carbon offset and credit trading
schemes that fail to account for these scale differences are destined to fail, at
least if we look more than 10 or 100 years down the road. Unfortunately, this
applies to virtually all such schemes at the present time.

30. See Yadvinder Malhi et al., Climate Change, Deforestation, and the Fate of the
Amazon, 319 SCIENCE 169, 169 (2008) (noting Amazonian forests “removal by deforestation
can itself be a driver of climate change and a positive feedback on externally forced climate
change”).
31. The only sinks of this temporal scale are the deep oceans—which are already
absorbing roughly half of human-produced CO2—and geologic formations deep underground.
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In the absence of a technological silver bullet, such as the one Broecker
envisions, the inescapable conclusion is that we need to leave as much coal, oil
and gas in the ground as possible, for as long as possible. To say that this is
politically impossible does not make it any less true. At the very least, it should
be the point of departure for all negotiations and debates, as anything less is a
potentially fateful concession.
III. The Built Environment
Policy informed by this conclusion must focus on what geographers call
the built environment: buildings, systems of transportation, energy and
communications, water, sewage and waste management facilities, farms,
factories, schools and hospitals, etc.32 The built environment “functions as a
vast, humanly created resource system, comprising use values embedded in the
physical landscape, which can be utilized for production, exchange and
consumption.”33 Pacala and Socolow have famously argued that a rapid,
comprehensive reconfiguration of the world’s built environment has the
potential to do what Broecker considers impossible; namely, “to meet the
world’s energy needs over the next 50 years and limit atmospheric CO2 to a
trajectory that avoids a doubling of the preindustrial concentration.”34 What
this would require is not so much new technologies, they argue, but an
aggressive and enormous scaling up of existing technologies in transportation,
energy, buildings, agriculture and land use.35
The built environment of the U.S. both presupposes and reinforces high
rates of GHG emissions. Its construction itself produced significant emissions,
and its design reflects the relatively cheap cost of energy during the twentieth
century. The built environment is also what enables—and in many ways
compels—American per capita emissions rates to be among the highest in the
world.36 The two largest sources of GHG emissions in the U.S., for example,
32. See DAVID HARVEY, THE LIMITS TO CAPITAL 233 (1982) (describing aspects of the
built environment).
33. Id.
34. S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the
Next 50 Years with Current Technologies., 305 SCIENCE 968, 968 (2004).
35. See id. (noting these technologies have passed beyond laboratories and many are
already being used in industry).
36. See The Conference Bd. of Can., Environment: GHG Emissions Per Capita,
http://www.conferenceboard.ca/hcp/ details/environment/greenhouse-gas-emissions. aspx#_ftn3
(last visited Nov. 3, 2009) (noting that among developed nations, only Australia and Canada
have higher per capita GHG emissions than the US).
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are electricity generation and transportation, for which coal and petroleum,
respectively, are by far the major fuels.37 In both cases, consumers have only
limited scope of influence. They can reduce their electricity use and drive more
efficient automobiles, but the power plants, streets, and highways they rely on
are fixed in place and largely beyond their control, and freight trucking exceeds
passenger vehicles as a source of GHG emissions in any case.38 One of Pacala
and Socolow’s “stabilization wedges” involves doubling the average efficiency
of automobiles,39 a daunting task, but relatively easy in comparison to other
wedges. Reducing vehicle miles by fifty percent,40 for example, would entail
reorganizing the geographical distribution of homes, businesses, schools, and
so forth.41 Another wedge would require improving the energy efficiency of all
buildings by 25 percent.42 All three of these measures together would still
achieve less than half of the necessary reductions, as a total of seven wedges is
required to keep the concentrations at twice pre-industrial levels in 2050, and
further steep reductions would still be necessary after that point.43
Whether built and owned by governments or private firms, the
components of the built environment have a number of things in common.
First, they tend to be very expensive to build, and still more so to replace. The
interstate highway system, to give just one example, is estimated to have cost
nearly $129 billion.44 Second, these costs generally must be absorbed up front,
before revenues can be generated from their use.
37. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Sinks: 1990-2007, Executive Summary (2009),
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/
emissions/usinventoryreport.html, (last visited Oct. 21, 2009) (reporting that electricity
generation accounted for 42 percent of CO2 emissions from fossil fuels in the US in 2007;
transportation accounted for 33 percent. They accounted for 34 and 26 percent, respectively, of
all US GHG emissions). See also Lee Chapman, Transport and Climate Change: A Rev., 15 J.
OF TRANSPORT GEOGRAPHY 354, 355 (2007) (concluding that this pattern holds across the
developed world).
38. See Chapman, supra note 15, at 356 (“[T]he major contributor is road freight which
typically accounts for just under half of the road transport total.”).
39. See Pacala & Socolow, supra note 12, at 969 (raising fuel efficiency from 30 miles
per gallon to 60 miles per gallon).
40. See id. (suggesting another potential wedge).
41. See Chapman, supra note 15, at 364 (concluding that in the short term “policies to
change behavior and travel habits are more important than technological solutions”) (citing
Anable, J. & Boardman, B., Transport and CO2. (U.K. Energy Research Centre, Working
Paper, Aug. 2005)).
42. See Pacala & Socolow, supra note 12, at 969 (noting yet another wedge option).
43. See id. at 968 (pointing out the exact number of necessary wedges depends on annual
carbon emissions growth).
44. See U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and
Defense Highways, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/interstate.cfm , (last visited Oct.
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The built environment, therefore, depends heavily on financial instruments
and institutions that permit large scale borrowing and long-term amortization.
The total outstanding state and municipal debt in the U.S., which is mostly
comprised of long-term bonds issued to finance investments in the built
environment, was $1.85 trillion in 2005.45 From this, it follows that the built
environment must persist, not just physically but economically, far into the
future, if the bonds, mortgages and other debt instruments are to be successfully
retired. “Roads, railways, canals, airports, etc., cannot be moved without the
value embodied in them being lost.”46 As geographer David Harvey notes;
“immobile physical and social infrastructures . . . are crafted to support certain
kinds of production, certain kinds of labour processes, distributional
arrangements, consumption patterns, and so on.”47
Finally, the built environment is not only a very complex and expensive
investment, but also the ‘habitat’ in which people live, with profound effects on
both thought and behavior. Expectations about resource use, for example, how
warm or cool one’s house should be, how frequently to bathe, what counts as
waste, or how far it is reasonable to travel for work or pleasure, are all deepseated dispositions formed by long-term interactions with one’s built
environment. These dispositions are highly variable depending on economic
and cultural resources, and they are subject to change. But they are,
nonetheless, persistent. In geographical parlance, the built environment
produces space-time; it is naturalized as the taken-for-granted and normal.48
This means that changing the built environment is as much a social and
psychological challenge as it is a physical and financial one.
Taken together, these characteristics make the built environment the site of
a complex interplay of inertial physical structures and financial instruments, on
the one hand, and dynamic transformations, on the other. The dynamism stems
not only from processes of physical wear and tear, which may or may not be
countered by ongoing investments in maintenance and repair, but also, and
more rapidly, by the interrelatedness of each component with the others.
“[S]ince the usefulness of individual elements depends, to large degree, upon
21, 2009) (estimating the cost since 1958).
45. See Fed. Reserve Bd., Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States: Flows and
Outstandings
First
quarter
2006,
123
http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/Z1/20060608/z1.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2009) (containing the assets and liabilities for
the flow of funds).
46. HARVEY, supra note 10, at 380.
47. Id. at 428.
48. See DAVID HARVEY, JUSTICE, NATURE, AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF DIFFERENCE 222–23
(1996) (explaining the social construction of space and time).
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the usefulness of surrounding elements, complex patterns of depreciation and
appreciation . . . are set in motion by individual acts of renewal, replacement or
transformation.”49 The situation is compounded by the fact that privately
owned components of the built environment, such as homes and factories, have
asset values that float in the market, and their owners have a strong interest in
protecting those values.50
It is clear that the U.S. built environment must be changed, rapidly and
radically, if we are to address global warming. But we cannot easily write it off
and start over. We are too heavily invested in it, financially and otherwise.
This predicament holds at every scale from households, small businesses and
municipalities up to national governments and transnational firms. It offers the
best lens, I believe, through which to understand the obstacles and opposition to
effective climate policy in the US.
IV. Devaluation: By Policy or by Climate?
As fixed capital, the built environment is subject to devaluation, not only
from ordinary use and physical deterioration but also from social and economic
processes operating on larger scales.51 Neighborhoods decline, factories
become obsolete, for reasons that may be entirely independent of their
particular physical characteristics. The market value of an inefficient car or
home will drop as energy prices rise. Although we tend to notice these
dynamics most when they are abrupt and painful, they are not anomalies. On
the contrary, they are an intrinsic feature of capitalism, with observable
geographical patterns. “The total effect is that place-specific devaluations
become more than just a random, accidental affair . . . . The devaluations are
systematized into a certain spatial configuration . . . . The continuous restructuring of spatial configurations through revolutions in value must again be
seen, however, as a normal feature of capitalist development.”52 When
devaluation occurs via market mechanisms it is widely viewed as a necessary, if
unfortunate, price of progress, for which no one can be held responsible.53 Not
49. HARVEY, supra note 10, at 234.
50. See Freddie Mac, Freddie Mac Update:
October 2009, 9,
http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/ pdffiles/investor-presentation.pdf (last visited Nov. 7,
2009) (finding that US single family mortgage debt totaled $10.4 trillion as of June 30, 2009;
equity in those homes was less than debt ($9.6 trillion)).
51. See HARVEY, supra note 10, at 425 (“[D]evaluation is a social determination.”).
52. HARVEY, supra note 10, at 426.
53. See id. (“The continuous re-structuring of spatial configurations through revolutions
in value [is] . . . a normal feature of capitalist development.”).
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so when the cause can be identified as the conscious act of a political body; no
one wants their durable assets, from SUVs to container ships, devalued by
regulatory or legal mechanisms.
In a fortuitous paradox, however, climate change renders this view of our
predicament simplistic and misleading. Directly or indirectly, global warming
is going to devalue our current built environment anyway.54 It is not a question
of whether, but when and how it will happen. Hurricanes are projected to
become more intense due to rising sea surface temperatures, threatening coastal
cities with abrupt destruction such as occurred in New Orleans and along the
Gulf Coast during Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Sea-level rise poses a similar
threat, with impacts that are more gradual but also more widespread and
permanent.55 Increasingly severe weather events such as floods, droughts and
heat waves promise to stress our existing systems for providing water and
shelter, with potentially deadly public health impacts.56 As glaciers retreat and
snowpack declines, large populations and economies face enormous costs to
build or retrofit dams, reservoirs, and aqueducts to store and convey adequate
water supplies. Agricultural investments face possible devaluation from
shifting climatic conditions and more frequent or intense pest outbreaks. We
cannot know how soon or how abruptly devaluation by climate change will take
place for any given location, but it is clear that we should expect it to happen on
a time-scale of decades, not centuries. These impacts will be highly uneven
between regions, and generally more severe in the poorer parts of the world,57
but they will force changes in the built environment virtually everywhere,
sooner or later, if human societies are to adapt.
The policy implications are far-reaching. The question becomes not
whether widespread devaluation will occur, but how: by the effects of climate
change, or by intentional, deliberate policies? This should be viewed not so
much as a crisis but as a political opportunity. If we assume that 2-5 percent
annual reinvestment in the built environment is a normal necessity under any
circumstances, then in 20-50 years we can expect it to turn over in its entirety.
This may or may not be fast enough to avoid all, or even most, of the impacts of
global warming, but it is a logic that everyone should be able to understand,
54. See generally R. L. Wilby, A Rev. of Climate Change Impacts on the Built Env’t, 33
BUILT ENV’T 31 (2007).
55. See id. at 33 (rising sea levels pose a problem for cities).
56. See id. at 38–40 (discussing the effect of climate change on the world’s water
resources).
57. M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson (eds).
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 2007. Cambridge University Press.
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regardless of political or ideological leanings. If every decision we make
regarding the built environment is made with climate change as a high priority,
we may be able to anticipate, absorb, and in many ways control the processes of
devaluation that are in store for us. Framed this way, there is no clear
distinction between mitigation and adaptation; a built environment that
produces fewer GHG emissions is generally also more resistant to rising
temperatures, diminishing water supplies, and declining fossil energy inputs.

